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Abstract—Deep neural network (DNN) has demonstrated its
success in multiple domains. However, DNN models are inher-
ently vulnerable to adversarial examples, which are generated
by adding adversarial perturbations to benign inputs to fool
the DNN model to misclassify. In this paper, we present a
cross-layer strategic ensemble framework and a suite of robust
defense algorithms, which are attack-independent, and capable
of auto-repairing and auto-verifying the target model being
attacked. Our strategic ensemble approach makes three original
contributions. First, we employ input-transformation diversity
to design the input-layer strategic transformation ensemble
algorithms. Second, we utilize model-disagreement diversity to
develop the output-layer strategic model ensemble algorithms.
Finally, we create an input-output cross-layer strategic ensemble
defense that strengthens the defensibility by combining diverse
input transformation based model ensembles with diverse output
verification model ensembles. Evaluated over 10 attacks on
ImageNet dataset, we show that our strategic ensemble defense
algorithms can achieve high defense success rates and are more
robust with high attack prevention success rates and low benign
false negative rates, compared to existing representative defense
methods.
I. INTRODUCTION
Deep learning has increasingly become ubiquitous in Cloud
offerings, Internet of Things, and cyber-physical systems.
However, deep neural networks (DNNs) are vulnerable to
adversarial examples [1], which are artifacts generated by
adding human-imperceptible distortions to the benign inputs
to fool the target DNN model to misclassify randomly or
purposefully. A growing number of attacks has been reported
in the literature to generate adversarial examples of varying
sophistication. As more defense methods are being proposed,
the attack-defense arms race has accelerated the development
of more aggressive attacks, and developing effective defenses
are shown to be substantially harder than designing new
attacks [2]–[4]. How to protect deep learning systems against
adversarial input attacks has become a pressing challenge.
In this paper we present a cross-layer strategic ensemble
defense approach with three original contributions. First, we
develop the input transformation based ensemble algorithms
by leveraging diverse input noise reduction techniques. Sec-
ond, we develop the output model ensemble algorithms by uti-
lizing model-disagreement diversity to create multiple failure
independent model verifiers. Third, we create an input-output
cross-layer strategic ensemble defense method that strengthens
the robustness of our cross-layer ensemble by combining
diverse input transformation ensembles with diverse output
model ensembles. Due to the space limit, we only evaluate 10
representative attacks on ImageNet dataset. The results show
that our cross-layer strategic ensemble defense can achieve
high defense success rates, and is more robust with high attack
prevention success rates and low benign false negative rates,
compared to existing representative defense approaches.
II. OVERVIEW
A. Characterization of Adversarial Attacks
Adversarial examples can be generated by the black-box
access to the prediction API of the target model being at-
tacked [1]. In this paper, we measure the adversarial effect of
attacks by the attack success rate, the misclassification rate,
and the attack confidence, and measure the cost of an attack
by the perturbation distance, the perception distance, and the
average time to generate one adversarial example.
Attack Success Rate (ASR) is defined as the percentage
of successful adversarial examples over all attack inputs.
Misclassification Rate (MR) is defined as the percentage
of misclassified adversarial examples over all attack inputs.
Mean confidence on adversarial class (AdvConf) is
defined as the mean confidence on the adversarial class of
successful adversarial examples number of successful adver-
sarial examples.
Perturbation Distance Cost (DistPerturb) is defined by
the root mean square deviation between benign input x and
its adversarial counterpart xadv .
Perception Distance Cost (DistPercept) measures the
perception distance of successful adversarial examples by
applying the human perception distance metrics in [5].
Time cost (Time): The per-example generation time for
each adversarial attack is measured in seconds.
Table 1 shows the experimental results of 12 attacks on
the ImageNet, containing 1.2 million training images and
50000 validation images in 1000 classes. All experiments are
conducted on an Intel 4 core i5-7200U CPU@2.50GHz server
with a Nvidia Geforce 1080Ti GPU. We select a pre-trained
model with a competitive prediction accuracy for the dataset,
and target model trained on ImageNet using TensorFlow
MobileNet has a validation accuracy of 0.695. We consider
queries with pre-generated adversarial examples by building
our attack system on top of the EvadeML-Zoo [6]. The first
100 correctly predicted benign examples in the validation set
are selected for the attack experiments. We consider a total of
12 representative attacks, two of which are untargeted attacks
(UA): Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM [1]), Basic Iterative
Method(BIM [7]). The other ten are targeted attacks from
five attack algorithms: targeted FGSM(TFGSM), targeted BIM
(TBIM), and Carlini & Wagner attacks (CW∞, CW2, CW0
[8]). L∞, L2, and L0 are the three perturbation norms. We
use two representative types of attack targets: the most-likely
attack class in the prediction vector (yT = argmaxy 6=Cx
−→y ,
most) and the least-likely attack class (yT = argmin−→y , LL).
Cx is the correct class for input x. We run experiments of all
12 attacks on ImageNet. The θ is set to 0.0078 for FGSM as
small θ is sufficient to cause high attack SR. For BIM, the per
step θ is 0.002, and the maximum θ is 0.004. For CW attacks,
the attack confidence is set to 5 and the maximum optimization
iteration is set to 1000. The adversarial example is fed into
the target ML model every 100 iterations of optimization to
check if the attack is successful. We make three observations.
(1) Attacks that have higher ASR, though may take longer
time, do not directly correlate to the amount of perturbation
distortion in distance and perception. (2) Given the same attack
target model, for CW and JSMA attacks, the least likely (LL)
target cost more time and larger distortions, but this is not true
for other attacks, showing the divergence behavior of different
attack methods [9], [10]. (3) All attacks also exhibit certain
divergence behavior in terms of attack effect. Two examples of
the same class under the same attack often result in two diverse
destination classes (untargeted) or one successful and one
failed (targeted). For the same attack method, the divergence
of attack effect varies notably for the classifier trained using
different DNN models over the same training dataset.
ImageNet attack effect confidence cost
attack ASR MR AdvConf DistPerturb DistPercept Time(s)
FGSM
UA
0.99 0.99 0.6408 1.735 1152 0.019
BIM 1 1 0.9971 1.186 502.5 0.185
LL 0 0.91 N/A N/A N/A 0.22
TBIM
most 1 1 0.9999 1.175 485.4 0.222
LL 0.53 0.79 0.7263 1.185 501.2 0.338
CW∞
most 1 1 0.9850 0.957 217.9 74.7
LL 0.95 0.96 0.8155 1.394 592.8 237.8
CW2
most 1 1 0.9069 0.836 120.5 13.2
LL 0.94 0.94 0.7765 1.021 204.5 23.1
CW0
most 1 1 0.97 2.189 59.5 662.7
LL 1 1 0.8056 3.007 207.5 794.9
TABLE 1: Evaluation of attacks.
B. Existing Defenses and Limitations
Existing defenses are classified into 3 broad categories: ad-
versarial training, gradient masking, and input transformation.
Adversarial training is a class of defense techniques that
aim to improve the generalization of a trained model (the target
classifier) against known attacks at prediction (test) time by
retraining the target model using both benign training set and
adversarial examples generated using known attacks [1]. The
improved robustness is limited to the known adversarial attack
algorithms that generate adversarial examples used in training
the target classifier [3].
Gradient masking refers to the defense techniques that
hide gradient information from an adversary, aiming to reduce
the sensitivity of a trained model to small changes in input
data [11].
Input transformation refers to the defenses that reduce
the sensitivity of the target model to small input changes
by applying careful noise reduction to the input data before
sending it to the target model for prediction by employing
some popular image preprocessing techniques like binary
filters and median smoothing filters are employed in [6].
Limitations of Existing Defenses. (1) The performance of
existing defense methods is sensitive to the magic parameters
inherent in their design, such as the percentage of adversarial
examples in a batch in adversarial training, the temperature in
Defensive Distillation, the detection threshold trained on be-
nign dataset and adversarial inputs in both input transformation
and denoising auto-encoder detector defense. Such dataset-
specific and/or attack algorithm-specific control parameters
make the defense methods non-adaptive [3]. (2) The detection-
only methods, though useful to flag the suspicious inputs with
high detection success rate, are considered as passive defenses,
not able to make the ML component survive its routine
function under attack. Such defenses may not be suitable for
applications that cannot tolerate real-time interruptions, such
as self-driving cars, disease diagnosis.
C. Solution Approach
We argue that a robust defense should be attack-independent
and can generalize over the attack algorithms, and should not
depend on finding the attack-specific or dataset-specific control
knob (threshold) to distinguish adversarial inputs from benign
inputs. We design our strategic ensemble defense algorithms
with three objectives. First, our defense algorithms should
be attack-independent, capable of auto-repairing and auto-
verifying the target model being attacked, and can generalize
over different attacks. Second, our defense algorithm should
be transparent to the users of the target learning system, with
no modification to the application interface (API) used for
prediction (testing). Finally, the runtime defense execution at
the prediction phase should be efficient to meet the real-time
requirements. The following metrics are used to measure and
compare each defense method.
Prevention Success Rate (PSR): The percentage of the
adversarial examples that are repaired and correctly classified
by the target model under defense.
Detection Success Rate (TSR): The percentage of adver-
sarial examples that could not be repaired but are correctly
flagged as the attack example by the defense system.
Defense Success Rate (DSR): The percentage of adversarial
examples that are either repaired or detected. DSR = PSR +
TSR.
False Positive Rate (FP): The percentage of the adversarial
examples that can be correctly classified (repaired) but are
flagged as adversarial when all inputs are adversarial exam-
ples. For the benign test set, we use BFP to represent the
Attack test set
FGSM BIM TBIM CW∞ CW2 CW0
UA most LL most LL most LL most LL
Im
ag
eN
et
no defense 0.695 0.01 0 0 0.21 0 0.04 0 0.6 0 0
quan-1-bit 0.24 0.28 0.26 0.29 0.3 0.27 0.28 0.27 0.29 0.28 0.22
quan-4-bit 0.695 0.05 0.05 0.08 0.83 0.31 0.76 0.47 0.82 0.1 0.58
medfilter-2*2 0.65 0.22 0.28 0.37 0.78 0.68 0.82 0.74 0.85 0.84 0.85
medfilter-3*3 0.61 0.33 0.41 0.51 0.73 0.7 0.8 0.73 0.78 0.79 0.82
NLM-11-3-2 0.7 0.05 0.09 0.1 0.82 0.28 0.75 0.43 0.87 0.04 0.25
NLM-11-3-4 0.66 0.1 0.25 0.3 0.83 0.59 0.83 0.68 0.84 0.2 0.5
NLM-13-3-2 0.7 0.06 0.09 0.1 0.81 0.32 0.75 0.46 0.87 0.04 0.27
NLM-13-3-4 0.665 0.11 0.26 0.31 0.82 0.59 0.84 0.68 0.87 0.2 0.51
rotation -12 0.62 0.41 0.55 0.69 0.77 0.74 0.74 0.73 0.78 0.68 0.64
rotation -9 0.635 0.39 0.53 0.68 0.8 0.77 0.79 0.78 0.8 0.69 0.72
rotation 3 0.68 0.29 0.44 0.57 0.88 0.71 0.83 0.76 0.82 0.65 0.78
rotation 6 0.68 0.33 0.49 0.67 0.82 0.78 0.85 0.79 0.83 0.72 0.74
med-3*3, rot -9, rot 6 0.75 0.53 0.64 0.75 0.96 0.90 0.92 0.89 0.93 0.87 0.89
TABLE 2: Defense accuracy of different input transformation techniques for ImageNet
percentage of the correctly classified benign examples being
flagged as adversarial.
III. INPUT TRANSFORMATION ENSEMBLE
A. Exploiting Input Denoising Diversity
The main goal of developing input-transformation ensem-
ble methods is to apply data modality specific input noise
reduction techniques to clean the input to the target model,
aiming to remove adversarial perturbations. We argue that the
input noise reduction techniques should be chosen to preserve
certain verifiable properties, such as the test accuracy of the
target model on benign inputs, while capable of removing the
adverse effect from an adversarial input. Image smoothing and
image augmentation are common techniques for image noise
reduction. The former includes pixel quantization by color bit
depth reduction, local spatial smoothing, and non-local spatial
smoothing. The latter includes image rotation, image cropping,
and rescaling, image quilting and compression.
Rotation: As a standard image geometric transformation
technique provided in SciPy library [12], rotation preserves
the geometric distance of the image and does not change the
neighborhood information for most of the pixels except for the
corner cases. In our prototype defense, the rotation degree is
varied from -12 to 12 with an interval of 3 degree.
Color-depth reduction: It reduces the color depth of 8 bits
(28 = 256 values) to i bits (2i values). If i = 1, then the bit
quantization will replace the [0,255] space to 1-bit encoding
with 2 values: it takes 0 when the nearby pixel value is smaller
than 127 and takes 1 when pixel values are in the range of
[128, 255]. We use quan-i-bit to denote the quantization of
the input image from the original 8-bit encoded color depth
to i-bit (1 ≤ i < 8).
Local spatial smoothing: It uses nearby pixels to smooth
each pixel, with Gaussian, mean or median smoothing [13],
[14]. A median filter runs a sliding window over each pixel of
the image, where the center pixel is replaced by the median
value of the neighboring pixels within the window. The size
of the window is a configurable parameter, ranging from 1 up
to the image size. MedFilter-k ∗ k denotes the median filter
with neighborhood kernel size k ∗ k. A square shape window
size, e.g., 2× 2 or 3× 3, is often used with reflect padding.
Non-local spatial smooth (NLM): It smooths over similar
pixels by exploring a larger neighborhood (11 × 11 search
window) instead of just nearby pixels and replaces the center
patch (say size of 2×2) with the (Gaussian) weighted average
of those similar patches in the search window [15], [16]. NLM-
a-b-c denotes non-local means smoothing filter with searching
window size a ∗ a, patch size b ∗ b and Gaussian distribution
parameter c. NLM 11-2-4 refers to the NLM filter with 11×11
search window, 2× 2 patch size and the filter strength of 4.
Unlike adversarial input which injects a small amount
of crafted noise to selected pixels in each benign image,
input transformation is applied to entire image uniformly,
which utilizes the inconsistency of the adversarial examples
in terms of the location and the amount of noise to make the
perturbation less or no longer effective. As the prerequisite for
the transformation algorithm selection, all positive examples
should be remain positive under different input transformation
techniques. Also each negative example tends to be negative
in its own way and each adversarial example is destructive in
its own way. Hence, different input transformation techniques
tend to have different noise reduction effect on adversarial
inputs. Strategic ensemble of multiple input transformation
techniques can provide robust defense by exploiting noise
reduction diversity.
Assume that we have a pool of diverse candidate trans-
formation techniques of size m, by selecting k (m ≥ k ≥ 1)
input transformation techniques out ofm, we obtain k different
versions for each input example. The strategic ensemble of
k input transformation techniques is to find those that can
effectively complement one another on negative examples. A
primary criterion for the candidate selection is the high test
accuracy on benign test set compared to the test accuracy
of the original input example. Time cost could be another
criterion. For example, the rotation matrix has a simple and
fast transformation. It takes only 0.19s to rotate a color image,
compared to 6s for median filter and 59s for non-local filter
on the same image. In contrast, generating an adversarial
example using CW attack family are order of magnitude more
expensive with CW2 at 13∼23 seconds on average to generate
an adversarial example and CW0 at 662∼795 seconds per
input example on average.
To verify our analysis, we conduct experiments for the
four types of input transformation methods on the benign
validation set ImageNet, as well as the adversarial examples
generated by all 10 attacks. The benign test accuracy is used
as a reference to choose the input transformation method that
preserves the competitive test accuracy on the noise reduced
version of the benign test set. Table 2 shows the results. We
observe several interesting facts. First, employing an input
transformation technique can improve the robustness of the
target model under attack. However, no single method effective
across all 10 attacks. Second, the least-likely attacks are
relatively easier to defend than the most-likely attacks. One
reason could be that the perturbation in the least-likely attacks
is larger and the noise reduction may work more effectively.
Finally, strategic ensemble of different input transformation
techniques, especially those that have competitive benign test
accuracy, can provide good average robustness over the 10
attacks.
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Fig. 1: ImageNet input-transformation ensemble defense.
Table 3 shows the input transformation ensemble results on
the ImageNet dataset. The first row shows that our strategic
teaming algorithm is attack-independent with average DSR of
83.5% over 10 attacks for ImageNet. Next, we compare our
results with the design of our attack-independent version of
detection-only defense using the fixed L1 upper bound (say
1.5) or the fixed lower bound (say 0.5). Conceptually, either
an upper bound L1 threshold that is above 1 or close to 2, or a
lower bound L1 threshold that is lower than 1 or close to zero,
can be used as the detection threshold. We compute the L1
distance between the prediction vector of each denoised ver-
sion with the prediction vector of its original input x. If the L1
distance above the detection-threshold (either upper or lower
fixed bound), we flag it as adversarial input. We also include
the attack-dependent detection-only method [6], which uses
adversarial example to set the adversarial detection thresholds.
We use the best combo identified in [6] in this comparison.
We make two observations from Table 3: (1) Adversarial
example-based threshold detection on attack examples and
benign test set can provide high DSR for the detection-only
methods ((DSR=TSR). The adversarial threshold of 1.693,
can achieve high DSR of 80.6% for ImageNet. (2) Using
attack-independent fixed L1 upper or lower bound threshold,
adversarial examples can be flagged with reasonable detection
success rate (TSR) but at the cost of higher BFP.
Figure 1 provide an example illustration of three diverse
input transformation methods on an ImageNet test example of
hen under six scenarios: no attack (benign), two untargeted
attacks and three targeted attacks. It shows the effectiveness
of the input transformation ensemble for this example input.
However, for some examples of ImageNet, these three input
transformation techniques may not be as effective as this case,
which is one of the primary motivation for us to develop the
output verification model ensemble as an alternative joint force
to the input transformation ensemble defense.
IV. OUTPUT VERIFICATION MODEL ENSEMBLE
The main objective of the output-layer verification model
ensemble is to protect the target model (TM) with the capa-
bility to verify and repair the prediction outcome of TM using
multiple failure-independent model verifiers and to use the
ensemble-approved prediction as the final output of the target
model (TM). We exploit the model disagreement diversity to
the output-layer strategic model ensembles. First, we select the
baseline candidate models based on a number of criteria, such
as high test accuracy, which should be comparable to that of
the target model on benign test set, and high model diversity
on disagreement measures, such as Kappa(κ)-statistics [17] for
each pair of the baseline models. Let N denote the cardinality
of the prediction result set, K denote the number of classes,
Nij denote the number of instances in the dataset that are
labeled as class i by one model and as class j by the other
model. κ metric is defined as:
fκ =
∑
K
i=1
Nii
N
−
∑K
i=1 (
Ni∗
N
− N∗i
N
)
1−
∑K
i=1 (
Ni∗
N
− N∗i
N
)
(1)
In Equation 1,
∑
K
i=1
Nii
N
denotes the agreement percentage,
i.e., the percentage of agreement made by the two classifiers
i and j under the same series of queries.
∑K
i=1(
Ni∗
N
− N∗i
N
)
denotes the chance agreement in which the ∗ is any label in
the output space. The κ metric is pair-wise metric. The closer
the κ metric is to 1, the more agreements are made by the two
models. The closer the κ metric is to 0, the more diverse the
two models are in terms of disagreement.
The baseline candidate verification models are selected first
based on their test accuracy. For ImageNet, MobileNet is
the target model, we select four pre-trained DNN classifiers:
VGG-16, VGG-19, ResNet-50 and Inception-V3 as the base-
line candidate models for illustration in this paper. We compute
the Kappa(κ) for each pair of the candidate models in the
baseline model pool of five models: the target model (TM)
and four defense models (DMs). Then we build the kappa-
ranked list of Kappa-diverse ensembles by the increasing order
of the average pairwise Kappa value for each team. For a
pool of 5 models, the total combination of ensembles of size
3 or higher is 60 (5×4×3). To avoid low quality ensemble
ensemble formation team strategy
FGSM BIM CW∞ CW2 CW0 BFP PSR TSR DSR
UA most LL most LL most LL
ImageNet (3*3, -9, 6) Conf-L1 0.75 0.53 0.90 0.92 0.89 0.93 0.87 0.89 0.03 0.727 0.108 0.835
ImageNet (3*3, -9, 6) L1-upper 1.5 0.55 0.77 0.92 0.96 0.64 0.96 0.94 1 0.1 0 0.843 0.843
ImageNet (3*3, -9, 6) L1-lower 0.5 0.92 0.93 1 0.99 0.9 0.99 1 1 0.59 0 0.966 0.966
ImageNet (3*3, -9, 6) Adv-Tr 1.693 0.479 0.633 0.778 0.979 0.727 0.976 0.891 1 0.036 0 0.806 0.806
ImageNet (5-bit, 2*2, 11-3-4) Adv-Tr 1.254 0.5 0.429 0.756 1 0.773 1 0.927 1 0.055 0 0.795 0.795
TABLE 3: Input-layer strategic teaming defense on ImageNet (bold). The detection-only defense using our attack-independent L1 thresholds
are included for comparative analysis.
that has low diversity, we select the top 3 Kappa team by
removing those ensembles that have high κ value. We get the
top three most diverse ensemble teams as the diverse ensemble
pool, which are the ensemble teams with the top three lowest
average pairwise Kappa values: (DM 1, 3); (DM 1, 3, 4), and
(DM 1, 2, 3, 4).
To compare the robustness of different model teaming
defense algorithms, we conduct a set of experiments using
all 10 attacks on ImageNet. We include in our comparison the
target model and four individual DMs for ImageNet and three
output verification model ensemble teams: random ensemble
from the baseline model pool, random κ ensemble and the best
κ ensemble. Table 4 reports the results. First, we observe that
the target model has either zero or close to zero test accuracy.
Second, each individual defense model (DM) has higher test
accuracy under all 10 attacks untargeted attacks. Third, the
test accuracy of DMs under targeted attacks is higher than that
under untargeted attack. The reason that the four DM models
provide better robustness over all 10 attacks compared to the
TM is two folds: (1) The adversarial examples are generated
over the black box access to the prediction API of the target
model (TM). (2) The adverse effect of these adversarial
examples on each of the four defense models (DMs) is due
to the transferability of adversarial examples [18]. Finally, the
bestκ model ensemble is most effective over all 10 attacks
in terms of average DSR (test/prediction accuracy), and all
three strategic output ensemble teams are more robust against
adversarial examples regardless whether it is the random base
ensemble, or the randomκ ensemble from the pool of κ ranked
teams, or the Bestκ ensemble. The last four defense ensembles
are formulated by our cross-layer strategic ensemble selection
methods, which we discuss in the next section.
V. INPUT-OUTPUT CROSS-LAYER STRATEGIC TEAMING
Our cross-layer strategic ensemble defense method is de-
signed to combine the input-layer transformation ensemble
with the output-layer model verification ensemble by maxi-
mizing the disagreement diversity (failure independence).
We use the notation inpu-transformation→ output ensemble
to denote the cross-layer strategic ensemble that performs
input transformation followed by model ensemble verification.
We use the notation input-transformation + output model
ensemble to denote the second type of cross-layer ensemble
co-defense strategy. For example, med 2*2 + Randκ denotes
the transformed input of x by med 2*2 filer is sent to only
the TM and the original input x is sent to the output-layer
model ensemble verification team, which output the cross-
layer defense-approved prediction result.
We compare four cross-layer strategic ensemble defense
algorithms over all 10 attacks on ImageNet and report the
results in the last four rows of Table 4. For ImageNet, most
of the cross-layer ensemble defense teams performs well
compared to the top performing input-layer transformation
ensembles and the top performing output-layer model veri-
fication ensembles, though in some cases, the output model
ensemble along can be more effective, such as RandBase:
DM 1,2,3 and bestκ DM: 1,3,4 under FGSM attack and CW2
attack. This also indicates that the input transformation method
rot 6 may not complement well with the output-layer model
ensemble. One of our ongoing research is to investigate good
criteria for most robust cross-layer ensemble formation.
VI. COMPARISON WITH EXISTING DEFENSE APPROACHES
We conduct the experiments to compare our strategic en-
semble approach with the representative defense methods in
three broad categories: Adversarial Training(AdvTrain) [1],
Defensive Distillation(DefDistill) [11] and Input Transforma-
tion Ensemble(EnsTrans) [19]. We did not find pre-trained
models on ImageNet with the adversarial training or de-
fensive distillation defense and the Intel 4 core i5-7200U
CPU@2.50GHz server with the Nvidia Geforce 1090Ti GPU
with 3000+ units were not able to complete the adversarial
training or the defensive distillation powered training on Ima-
geNet. Thus, we include CIFAR-10 in this set of comparison
experiments. For ImageNet, we only compare the strategic
teaming defense with Input Transformation Ensemble. Table 5
shows the results. For adversarial training, we use adver-
sarial examples generated from FGSM with random θ from
[0, 0.0156] for CIFAR-10. For defensive distillation, the tem-
perature is set to 50 for CIFAR-10. The input transformation
ensemble has two parameters for both datasets: the ensemble
size n and the crop size c, and it computes multiple randomly
cropped-and-padded input image (n times) using the given
crop size. In our experiments, the ensemble size is set to
10 for both ImageNet and CIFAR-10, and the crop size is
set to 28 for CIFAR-10 and 196 for ImageNet according to
the recommended settings in [19]. This set of experiments
shows that (1) our cross-layer strategic ensemble approach
consistently outperforms the existing defense approaches over
all 10 attacks on both datasets; and (2) for CIFAR-10, our
strategic teaming achieves 96.5% average DSR compared to
73.3% average DSR by the defensive distillation, the best
among the three representative existing defense methods.
For ImageNet, our output-layer strategic ensemble achieves
95.1% average DSR, and our cross-layer strategic ensemble
achieves 94.1%, both are much better than the ensemble
model
benign
acc
FGSM BIM TBIM CW∞ CW2 CW0
UA most LL most LL most LL most LL
Im
ag
eN
et
TM 0.695 0.01 0 0 0.21 0 0.04 0 0.06 0 0
DM 1 0.67 0.73 0.77 0.82 0.82 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.82 0.8 0.79
DM 2 0.68 0.7 0.78 0.81 0.85 0.83 0.83 0.84 0.84 0.81 0.76
DM 3 0.67 0.78 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.85 0.83 0.83 0.84 0.83 0.8
DM 4 0.735 0.86 0.85 0.91 0.93 0.92 0.91 0.92 0.9 0.91 0.84
RandBase: DM 1,2,3 0.770 0.92 0.92 0.91 0.93 0.92 0.94 0.91 0.93 0.92 0.95
Randκ: DM 1,2,3,4 0.755 0.83 0.9 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.91 0.92 0.9 0.89 0.89
Bestκ: DM 1,3,4 0.805 0.94 0.93 0.97 0.95 0.96 0.96 0.95 0.95 0.91 0.97
rot 6 → RandBase 0.785 0.93 0.9 0.92 0.95 0.93 0.94 0.91 0.95 0.89 0.94
rot 6 → Randκ 0.745 0.85 0.87 0.88 0.87 0.87 0.85 0.86 0.88 0.89 0.88
rot 6 → Bestκ 0.825 0.89 0.94 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.93 0.93 0.96 0.96 0.98
rot 6 + Bestκ 0.89 0.89 0.96 1 1 1 1 0.93 0.96 0.99 0.97
TABLE 4: Prediction Accuracy of the target model(TM) with 10 attacks, the baseline defense model(DM), the random baseline model
teaming (RandBase), the random κ teaming (Randκ) and the Bestκ teaming for ImageNet
CIFAR-10 FGSM BIM TBIM CW∞ CW2 CW0
Attack benign acc UA most LL most LL most LL most LL
Strategic Ensemble 0.9446 0.93 0.99 0.94 0.962 0.97 0.98 0.97 0.99 0.98 1
AdvTrain 0.879 0.64 0.58 0.464 0.798 0.68 0.77 0.75 0.79 0.44 0.48
DefDistill 0.9118 0.6 0.65 0.77 0.904 0.79 0.88 0.86 0.9 0.6 0.69
EnsTrans 0.8014 0.23 0.4 0.406 0.668 0.56 0.61 0.57 0.61 0.19 0.34
ImageNet FGSM BIM TBIM CW∞ CW2 CW0
Attack benign acc UA most LL most LL most LL most LL
Input Transformation Ensemble 0.75 0.53 0.64 0.75 0.96 0.90 0.92 0.89 0.93 0.87 0.89
Output Model Ensemble 0.805 0.94 0.93 0.97 0.95 0.96 0.96 0.95 0.95 0.91 0.97
Cross-layer Strategic Ensemble 0.825 0.89 0.94 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.93 0.93 0.96 0.96 0.98
EnsemInputTrans 0.715 0.41 0.6 0.74 0.9 0.8 0.91 0.82 0.92 0.76 0.86
TABLE 5: Defense success rate comparison of cross-layer strategic ensemble (StrategicEnsemble) with adversarial training(AdvTrain),
defensive distillation(DefDistill) and input transformation ensemble(EnsemTrans).
input transformation approach (72.8% average DSR). Even our
input-transformation ensemble alone achieves 79.7% average
DSR, compared to 72.8% average DSR by the ensemble input
transformation. This further demonstrates the robustness of our
diversity-enhanced strategic ensemble algorithms for defense
against adversarial examples.
VII. CONCLUSION
We have presented a cross-layer strategic ensemble de-
fense approach by combining input transformation ensem-
bles with output verification model ensembles by promot-
ing and guaranteeing ensemble diversity. Our strategic en-
semble approach is attack-independent, generalize well over
attack algorithms, and is capable of auto-repairing and auto-
verifying the target model being attacked. Evaluated using
ImageNet and CIFAR-10 over 10 representative attacks, we
show that our cross-layer ensemble defense algorithms can
achieve high defense success rates, i.e., high test accuracy
in the presence of adversarial attacks, and are more robust
compared to existing representative defense methods, with
high attack prevention success rates (PSR) and low benign
false negative rates (BFP). Our ongoing research continues
along two dimensions:(1)Developing theoretical foundation
for cross-layer strategic ensemble formulation algorithms with
verifiable robustness; and (2) Incorporating new generations of
attack algorithms, and new generations of defense methods in
the empirical comparison framework.
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